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1. Introduction 
Good schooling is frequently upheld as decisive in life, but empirical evidence remains quite 
ambiguous when it comes to answers about what makes a school  'good', and about what it is that 
people really value in education. Parents making school choices seem well aware of their preferences, 
and go to great lengths to secure places for their children at their preferred schools. However, social 
scientists have had mixed success in eliciting any general conclusions about these preferences.  
Researchers in education have regularly used survey responses to learn about preferences for 
schools (e.g. Coldron and Boulton, 1991; Flatley et al., 2001; and Schneider and Buckley, 2002). The 
evidence from this field is that parents rank academic outcomes highly among the reasons for 
choosing a school, but other factors play an important role, such as distance from home, school 
composition, safety and well being. More recently, parents' actual choices of schools and teachers 
have been used as an alternative way to uncover preferences for school attributes (e.g. Hastings et al., 
2005; and Jacob and Lefgren, 2007).  
Apart from these examples, the vast majority of research in the field has looked for evidence of 
the value of schools in the capitalisation of their benefits into housing prices – i.e. using the hedonic 
valuation method. This wide-ranging international literature has shown that the demand for school 
quality is at least partly revealed in housing prices whenever school places are assigned to 
neighbouring homes. Gibbons and Machin (2008), Black and Machin (2010), Nguyen-Hoang and 
Yinger (2011) and Machin (2011) provide summaries of recent evidence, all suggesting a consensus 
estimate of around 3-4% house price premium for one standard deviation increase in school average 
test scores. Bayer et al. (2007) offer a structural modification based on discrete housing choices that 
provides a correction to the standard hedonic framework when preferences are heterogeneous, and 
come to similar conclusions.  
A limitation of this line of work is that – with only a few exceptions – it is confined to showing 
that prices follow headline school performance measures based on school average test scores. 
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However, better school test scores could occur through improvements in school intake or through 
faster pupil progress – potentially driven by teaching quality, school resources, peer effects and school 
„effectiveness‟ generally. One possibility is that parents pay for school output or value-added because 
it represents what they expect their children to gain academically. A second possibility is that parents 
pay for good peers and favourable school composition – which are school inputs – irrespective of the 
likely contribution that these factors make to their own child's achievements.1 While the first 
perspective is interesting from a policy point of view because it puts a price on interventions that raise 
academic standards, the second one is relevant because of its implications for school segregation (e.g. 
Epple and Romano, 2000). Clearly then it matters which of these drivers is important in determining 
house prices. 
A handful of papers have taken steps to disentangle these two channels of influence. Brasington 
and Haurin's  (2006) results appear to show that that school value-added and initial achievements both 
have positive effects on prices, although this important point is lost in their conclusions. Kane et al. 
(2005) also consider value-added and average test scores as alternative indicators of school 
performance. However, they do not present specifications that include both indicators simultaneously, 
and do not aim to provide persuasive evidence on the importance of value-added. In contrast, Clapp et 
al. (2007) show that pupil ethnicity seems more important than test scores to home buyers around 
Connecticut schools, although the authors do not have access to data on pupils'  academic progress. 
Other papers have looked at the importance of school expenditure relative to test score outputs. For 
example, Downes and Zabel (2002) find that test scores are capitalised into local house prices, 
whereas measures of school expenditures are not. Very recently, Cellini et al. (2010) use referenda 
outcomes in California‟s school finance system to suggest that house prices respond to the level of 
capital expenditure per pupil and that this cannot be fully explained by changes in test scores. 
                                                 
1 See Kramarz et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion, together with empirical tests, of the relative importance of pupil, 
school and peer effects in determining test scores. Their findings suggest that a large part of the variation in test scores is 
explained by pupil attributes, followed by school quality differentials. On the other hand, peers‟ characteristics matter less. 
This result is consistent with Gibbons and Telhaj (2008), Lavy et al. (2011) and most other studies on peer effects. 
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Occasionally other school attributes have been considered. For example, Figlio and Lucas (2004) find 
that state-assigned school ratings have a transient effect on prices, over and above test scores, 
suggesting that householders draw additional information about achievement from these grades, or 
else value the ratings in their own right. Finally, Gibbons and Machin (2006) suggest that popularity in 
itself raises prices, given that over-capacity schools command an additional premium relative to under-
capacity schools with equal performance. 
Our paper moves this literature forward in a number of important ways. Our first contribution is 
to delineate the house price response to educational value-added, which we treat as the school's 
expected production output and as distinct from intake composition. To the best of our knowledge, our 
research is the first to use a convincing identification strategy to show that parents significantly value 
school value-added. Our results also suggest that parents value school composition, even if the latter 
aspect is not a productive input (conditional on school value-added) in the educational production 
function.  
Our second contribution is to improve and test the boundary discontinuity regression method, 
which has become the favoured research approach in this field as a way to mitigate the effects of 
endogeneity induced by unobserved neighbourhood characteristics. We make several innovative 
contributions to this methodology, which can be summarised as follows: (a) We set out clearly the 
assumptions involved in identifying school quality effects on prices from discontinuities at admission 
zone boundaries; (b) We extend the method to a context in which school admission zones are fuzzy, 
overlapping and only partially bounded; (c) We combine matching methods with the regression-
discontinuity design to allow for a fully non-parametric specification of the way housing observables 
affect price differentials across boundaries; (d) We incorporate in our models a variety of boundary 
fixed effects and spatial trends to account semi-parametrically for between-district unobserved 
heterogeneity (e.g. in refuse collection and policing) and trends in amenities across boundaries; (e) We 
make full and better use of the data by inverse-distance weighting our regressions such that 
identification comes from variation at the admission zone boundaries where neighbourhood 
 - 4 - 
heterogeneity is minimised. This is in contrast with previous work, which used samples restricted to 
within fixed buffer-zones close to boundaries (e.g. 1/4 mile); (f) We perform a number of falsification 
exercises and in particular a 'killer' falsification test which uses the quality of autonomous state 
schools (church schools) that do not admit on the basis of residential location, but administer the same 
standard tests as the mainstream schools that prioritise admission on place of residence.  
A final advantage of our work is that we establish these findings using large scale administrative 
data for the whole of England, and not just for one city (e.g. Boston or San Francisco) as done by 
previous research. The size and coverage of our data makes the above strategies feasible, and allows 
us to disentangle the price that parents are willing to pay for test score progression, as opposed to 
'consumption' of better peers in a general and representative context. In particular, we use the test 
score gain in standardized national tests between ages 7 and 11 to generate value-added measures of 
school quality, and condition on test scores at age 7 as a marker for students'  background. Although 
age 7 achievements could capture pre-age 7 school value-added, we show that the price effects from 
age 7 achievements that we detect in our results are almost completely explained by the background 
characteristics of the school intake, and in particular students' eligibility for free meals (a proxy for 
low family income).   
To preview our results, we find that a one-standard deviation change in school average final test 
scores brought about by school age 7 to age 11 value-added raises prices by around 3%. There is a 
similar association between higher age 7 achievement and house prices, which can be mainly 
attributed to the background characteristics of the school intake and not to pre-age 7 school quality. 
On the other hand, we show that there is no house price premium associated to living close to high 
quality schools that do not admit based on residence. This test – alongside other falsification exercises 
– demonstrates that our findings for schools that prioritise admissions on the basis of school-home 
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distance are causal and not spurious.2 In this respect, these exercises go much further than any 
previous study in the field. Finally, various calculations show that the magnitude of this house price 
response to school quality is plausible as a parental investment decision given the expected return in 
terms of future earnings of their children. 
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 explains our methods. Section 3 
discusses the context in which we apply our approach and the data setup. Section 4 presents our results 
and discussion, focussing firstly on identification of the effects of school performance on house prices, 
and then considering the role of value-added and school composition in this relationship. Finally, 
Section 5 provides some concluding discussions. 
2. Empirical Strategy 
Methodological framework 
Our empirical work uses a regression discontinuity design that builds on the geographical 'boundary 
discontinuity'  approach. This method was popularised for use in property value analysis by the work 
of Black (1999), and has been employed several times since (e.g. Bogart and Cromwell, 2000; 
Gibbons and Machin, 2003, 2006; Bayer and McMillan, 2005; Kane et al., 2005; Davidoff and Leigh, 
2007; Fack and Grenet, 2010; Bayer et al., 2007, and very recently Ries and Somerville, 2011 on 
boundary re-drawing in Vancouver). Closely related thinking provides the foundation of studies that 
investigate the effects of market access when there are changes in national borders or their 
permeability. Examples include Redding and Sturm (2008), who look at changes that occurred during 
German division and re-unification, and Hanson (2003) who focuses on the opening of Mexican 
border as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement. In a similar vein, boundary 
                                                 
2 Note that this is very different from the exercise of Fack and Grenet (2010), who concentrate on showing that house 
prices respond „less‟ to the quality of local non-autonomous school if there are autonomous schools in the area. The 
authors cannot perform a similar falsification test because their autonomous schools (unlike ours) are private schools and 
are not „ranked‟ using comparable performance tables as state schools (once more, unlike our autonomous schools). 
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discontinuities have been used to assess the effect of taxation on housing prices (Cushing, 1984), and 
on the location of manufacturing firms (Duranton et al., 2006; Holmes, 1998). 
The standard hedonic property value model is well known to economists (Sheppard, 1999). This 
models property market prices (or, most commonly, log property prices) as a linear combination of 
observable property attributes and the implicit prices of these attributes in the housing market. These 
implicit prices can be estimated by standard least squares regression techniques. However, the 
pervasive drawback with this approach is that researchers do not observe all salient property and 
neighbourhood characteristics, leading to serious omitted variable issues. This problem is particularly 
acute when neighbourhood amenity quality and local public good quality – like school quality – 
depends on the distribution of characteristics in the local population. In such cases, any unobserved 
attribute that raises local housing prices changes amenity quality through residential sorting, because 
higher price houses are (on average) occupied by higher income households. 
One way to mitigate this problem is to compare only close-neighbouring houses, because these 
often tend to be quite structurally similar and self-evidently have near-identical neighbourhood 
environments. Therefore, researchers can eliminate area effects in a house price model by taking 
differences between houses that are in close proximity. However, this strategy is not useful for 
obtaining implicit prices of neighbourhood attributes, unless there is a sharp discontinuity in the 
supply of these attributes between close-neighbouring homes. 
This last condition holds when school admissions are organised using contiguous pre-defined 
admission zones: residents on one side of the boundary have access to a different school or set of 
schools than do residents on the opposite side of the boundary. A researcher looking at the effect of 
schools on house prices can therefore reduce the biases caused by unobserved neighbourhood 
attributes by including attendance district boundary dummy variables in regression models (unless the 
boundaries are particularly long), or by working with differenced data from a matched pair of 
neighbouring houses on either side of the boundary. The empirical model underlying this approach is 
set out below in a way that will help explain our empirical methods. 
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The price ( p in logs) of a house sale, with characteristics  x c  in a geographical location c , is: 
     p s c x c g c       (1) 
Where  s c  represents the school 'quality'  that home buyers expect to be able to access by residence 
at c , prior to school admission, measured on the basis of school characteristics at periods prior to the 
house sale. These characteristics include both school composition and effectiveness, and in our 
empirical application we will try to estimate the effects of these different components separately. As 
usual,   represents unobserved housing attributes and errors that are assumed to be independent of 
x and c . The function  g c  represents unobserved influences on market prices that are correlated 
across neighbouring spatial locations, such that the price varies deterministically with geographical 
location, for example due to unobserved neighbourhood characteristics and amenities (other than 
schooling). Location c  can be specified in various ways, most flexibly in terms of a vector of 
geographical or Cartesian coordinates. We discuss this in more detail below. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
The fundamental identification problem arises because of the common dependence of prices, housing 
characteristics and anticipated school quality on the unobserved attributes of location c . A spatial 
differencing strategy eliminates common area fixed effects  g c . Taking differences between specific 
houses i  and j  results in the following specification:   
                 i j i j i i j j i j i jp p s c s c x c x c g c g c             (2) 
This transformation, on its own, does not appear to offer advantages. Least squares estimates of 
the implicit prices ( ,  ) are consistent if and only if the difference in unobservable price 
determinants    i jg c g c is uncorrelated with the difference in school quality    i js c s c  and with 
differences in other housing attributes    i i j jx c x c . This condition will not hold in general, and 
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consistent estimation of   requires the researcher to find locations ,i j  such that locally 
       , 0i j i jCov s c s c g c g c      and     0i jVar s c s c     (conditional on observed housing 
and neighbourhood characteristics). These two conditions will never be met simultaneously and 
exactly, except for pathological cases3, for any continuous functions    . , .s g  because the first 
condition requires that i jc c , which would violate the second. However, the two conditions can hold 
approximately for closely spaced neighbours if  .s  is discontinuous and  .g  is continuous such that: 
A1:         0i jVar g c g c     as 0i jc c  , where i jc c  is the Euclidian distance 
between house sales i  and j . 
A2:     i jVar s c s c      as 0i jc c  , where   is a positive constant (or positive 
definite matrix if s is multidimensional).4 
The geographical 'boundary discontinuity' approach amounts to an attempt to exploit A1 by 
choosing ,i j  to be as close together as possible, whilst ensuring that ,i j  are on different sides of an 
attendance zone boundary to satisfy A2. Note that the geographical boundary discontinuity method 
differs from standard regression discontinuity designs (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) in which a single 
forcing variable (e.g. voting share, such as in Lee et al., 2004) determines 'treatment' (e.g. party 
affiliation of elected representative), although the general principle is similar. 
In practical empirical settings, there are three main reasons why the identification strategy 
sketched above could fail:5 
                                                 
3 For example if   0
s c
c



, or    
i j
s c s c
c c
 

 
 and    
i j
g c g c
c c
 
 
 
 such that        , 0i j i jCov s c s c g c g c     . 
4 Note that assumption A2 is a necessary condition if there is to be any variation in school quality to allow estimation of an 
associated hedonic price. On the other hand, A1 is sufficient, but not necessary, given the pathological cases outlined in 
footnote 3. 
5 One additional assumption is that  g c  represents a spatially isotropic process, so that direction does not matter and 
buyers do not care more about, say, bad neighbours to the left than bad neighbours to the right. If this is not the case then 
even identical co-located properties may have different prices depending on which way buyers are looking when they make 
their valuation. 
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(a) There are spatial trends in amenities across boundaries such that, even if assumption A1 holds 
in principle, it is violated in practice because the distance between sales i jc c  in housing sales 
samples is never exactly zero. 
(b) There are boundary discontinuities in prices, not caused by school quality differences, which 
violates assumption A1. 
(c) School quality lacks any discontinuity at attendance boundaries, violating assumption A2. 
Regarding case (a), highly localised factors (e.g. a noisy next-door neighbour) that influence sales 
prices of individual homes, but are uncorrelated over space (i.e. they are 'noise', contained in i j  ) 
are not of serious concern. These property-specific factors do not affect housing market prices in a 
way that could influence school quality through population sorting. However, we do need to be 
concerned about spatially correlated amenities that could lead house prices on one side of a boundary 
to differ on average from house prices on the other side. This situation could arise if, for example, one 
attendance zone contained a rail station and another did not (see Gibbons and Machin, 2005, for 
evidence of the amenity value of rail access). This would result in higher prices, richer families and 
better schools in the 'station zone', and a spatial trend in house prices rising across the boundary 
towards the station. Because of this trend, the price differential between houses on different sides of 
the boundary grows with the distance between sales. Hence we could find a correlation between house 
prices and school quality amongst closely spaced neighbours that is not caused by the demand for 
school quality, but by residential sorting that is a consequence of demand for rail access. 
Even if there are no gradual cross-boundary price trends, there can be cases of type (b), where 
prices change sharply from one side of the boundary to the other. First, administrative attendance zone 
boundaries may coincide with distinct geographical features, e.g. major roads, which partition 
communities. If these communities are different, the boundary may create a discontinuity in average 
housing prices over short distances that is not school-related, violating the assumption that  g c  is 
continuous. This is a common critique of boundary-based methods, and it is important to refute it. 
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Secondly, even without visible evidence of the boundary on the ground, houses on different sides of a 
boundary could have different directional aspect or outlook. Consider, for example, two long rows of 
houses on an east-west running boundary, one with sunny gardens facing south and one with shady 
gardens facing north. If residents with children prefer sunny gardens, then this aspect could be 
sufficient to induce a housing price differential and a consequent school quality difference across the 
boundary. Thirdly, contiguous districts may have different tax rates or offer different district-specific 
amenities, like refuse collection or policing, generating a sharp discontinuity in prices that is not 
caused by schools. 
Lastly, lack of discontinuity of type (c) occurs if attendance boundaries do not, in practice, act as 
a barrier to pupils attending schools in districts neighbouring their homes. This could happen if 
changes in school policy have removed the importance of traditional attendance zones. Note however, 
that even if some pupils can cross these boundaries, condition A2 will still hold. In fact, identification 
(in the sense of condition A2) requires only that there is a discrete jump in the probability of attending 
schools on different sides of the boundary as one moves from a residence on one side to a residence on 
the other, but this change in probability need not be from zero to one – i.e. the discontinuity can be 
fuzzy (Imbens and Lemieux, 2007). This change in probabilities ensures that there is a discrete jump 
in expected school quality (before admission) from one side to the other.  
Proposed methods to address the identification problems 
A few of these identification concerns have been partly addressed in the existing literature. However, 
we take these problems into much deeper consideration and go a long way further than existing work 
in establishing the credibility of the boundary discontinuity approach in our empirical context. With 
this purpose, we extend the standard methodology and produce a series of powerful robustness and 
'falsification' checks. These key extensions and tests are as follows (numbered method M1-M9 for 
recognition in the Results section below): 
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M1. Visually assess and statistically test for the presence of discontinuities: Drawing on the regression 
discontinuity design literature (and similar to Bayer et al., 2007, and Kane et al., 2005), we 
provide some graphical evidence and statistical tests regarding such discontinuities in area 
characteristics. 
M2. Match property transactions with identical observable characteristics across administrative 
boundaries. We pair up each house sale with the nearest transaction on the opposite side of an 
administrative attendance district, where the transaction is of the same property type and occurs 
in the same year (Gibbons and Machin, 2006, and Fack and Grenet, 2010 apply a similar 
method). This approach borrows from the literature on non-parametric discrete-cell matching, 
first pioneered by Rubin (1973). In our set-up, this equates to allowing the price effects of 
matched property characteristics to vary by boundary. 
M3. Weight regressions to zero-distance housing transaction pairs. Earlier work (e.g. Black, 1999) 
tested robustness to cross-boundary trends by selecting houses in increasingly narrow distance 
bands along either side of the boundary, that is applying weights of 1 to transactions within a 
specified boundary distance, and weights of 0 to those outside that distance. We generalise this 
idea by weighting observations in inverse proportion to the distance between sales, such that 
greater weight applies to observations that are close neighbours (on opposite sides of the 
boundary). This is an important contribution of our approach, given that conditions A1 and A2 
hold as the distance between paired transactions approaches zero. Re-weighting our analysis in 
this way ensures that our identification predominantly comes from observations where the 
identifying assumptions A1 and A2 are most likely to hold. 
M4. Include boundary fixed effects in cross-boundary difference models. Our institutional context 
(described below in Section 3) offers us multiple schools on each side of an attendance district 
boundary, so school quality varies across boundaries and along a boundary within a given 
attendance district. This data structure means we can control for boundary fixed effects (using 
boundary dummy variables) in our cross-boundary differenced model, thus eliminating between-
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boundary variation due to unobservable factors fixed along to the boundary. This is crucial given 
assumption A1 and the problems with boundary-specific discontinuities highlighted in Section 
2.2 under case (b). 
M5. Control for distance-to-boundary trends and polynomials. We follow the regression discontinuity 
design literature by controlling for polynomial trends in 'distance' from the discontinuity  (e.g. 
DiNardo and Lee, 2004; Lee et al., 2004; and Clark, 2009). In our context, this 'distance' is 
literally the geographical distance from attendance district boundaries. Like other studies in this 
field, we impose some parametric structure, e.g. by specifying 
    2 3 2 311 12 13 21 22 23i j i i i j j jg c g c d d d d d d            , where id  is the distance from sale i  to the 
boundary, and jd  is the distance from the matched sale j  to the boundary. Note that we can 
further control for different trends for each boundary by including boundary dummy  distance-
to-boundary polynomial trends, and allow for asymmetric trends on opposite sides of boundaries. 
By explicitly modelling trends in prices as we move away from school district boundaries we act 
to mitigate the issues discussed under point (a) in Section 2.2. 
M6. Restrict our attention to boundaries where pupils rarely cross. Our data is unique in allowing us 
to observe whether pupils cross an admission district boundary to attend their school. Thus, we 
can check that our results are not compromised by the  'fuzziness' of the school quality 
discontinuity, or by the lack of it caused by excessive pupil movements across boundaries. This 
allays the concerns highlighted in point (c) in Section 2.2. 
M7. Restrict attention to boundaries that do not coincide with obvious geographical features. Our 
empirical analysis uses only inland school district boundaries that do not coincide with tidal 
estuaries and rivers (e.g. the Thames in London). In addition, using Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS) analysis, we can work out which attendance portions of the district boundaries 
coincide with major roads, motorways and railways, and eliminate these cases from our study to 
test their sensitivity to non-schooling related sources of price discontinuity as in point (b) above.  
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M8. Apply falsification tests using ‘fake’ attendance boundaries. We re-estimate our models using 
differences between transactions in the same attendance district and using differences between 
property transactions along imaginary attendance boundaries, created by translation of the 
geographical coordinates. While the first method was applied in Black (1999), the use of 
completely artificially translated boundaries is novel and provides a powerful and stringent 
falsification test. A finding of a positive association between school quality and housing prices in 
this setting would falsify the claim that price effects are causally linked to cross-boundary school 
quality discontinuities. This exercise further helps to allay the concerns raised in point (a) in 
Section 2.2, and to verify the validity of assumption A1.  
M9. Compare methodology and results for cases in which home location is and is not a school 
admission criterion. Our institutional context provides us with two types of schools. For non-
autonomous institutions, places are typically allocated according to how close a pupil lives to the 
school, and attendance district boundaries are binding. There are therefore compelling reasons to 
buy a home close to a school of choice, and on the 'right'  side of the boundary. On the other 
hand, autonomous schools (mainly religious) operate pupil admissions policies that do not 
compel families to buy their home close to the school (e.g. based on church attendance and 
denomination). Although parents might still buy a house close to the school of choice so as to 
minimise travel costs, they do not need to do so to secure admission to their children. Thus, we 
expect local house prices to respond to the quality of non-autonomous schools, but not to the 
quality of autonomous schools. This institutional feature provides us with a particularly 
demanding falsification test based on the comparison of the price response to the quality of both 
types of schools as an additional check on the issues raised in points (a) and (b) in Section 2.2. 
We discuss these features of the school admission system in more detail in Section 3.2. 
The robustness and falsification tests described above relate to identification of the causal effect 
of school quality and other characteristics on house prices. We now turn to describe an additional set 
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of identification issues that arise when the research goal is to interpret the above estimates as 
'willingness to pay' for school quality. 
Identification in hedonic models when there is sorting on school quality 
It is well known that empirical identification of marginal willingness to pay for any neighbourhood 
amenity in a hedonic model is challenging when different households have different incomes and 
different preferences for this amenity leading to residential sorting. Under these conditions, the 
distribution of household characteristics near good quality schools will be different from the 
distribution of characteristics of residents near poor quality schools, even if school quality is the only 
factor determining house prices. This sorting has two consequences. 
Firstly, linear regression estimates may not provide estimates of the mean valuation of school 
quality, because the marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for school quality varies across the 
distribution of household characteristics. Obviously, it is incorrect to simply model this heterogeneity 
by interacting school quality with household characteristics (e.g. income), because if WTP varies by 
characteristics, then these characteristics are endogenous in house price regression models. The 
innovative paper by Bayer et al. (2007) builds on Berry et al. (1995), and focuses on this particular 
identification problem. They describe a solution using a two-stage structural approach that imposes a 
particular functional form on the residential choice and sorting process (coupled with an 
instrumentation strategy). In terms of detail, the first stage in their estimator involves a multinomial 
logit model on actual housing choices. Although technically impressive, this method relies on strong 
and hard-to-test assumptions about the shape of the indirect utility function and on the Independence 
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) hypothesis invoked to estimate multinomial logit models. It is thus 
difficult to generalise its applicability and understand the consequences of the failure of any of the 
required assumptions. In our work, we do not wish to impose this much structure, but present no novel 
solution to these issues. In the presence of heterogeneous preferences and/or incomes and sorting 
across boundaries, our discontinuity design will provide a weighted average of the marginal WTP of 
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residents along the admissions zone boundary. This estimate may be an upward or downward biased 
estimate of mean marginal WTP. However, in our defence, the work by Bayer et al. (2007) shows that, 
both empirically and from a theoretical point of view, the 'traditional'  hedonic models are effective at 
evaluating mean WTP in contexts (like ours) where the amenity in question is supplied at various 
qualities in many different locations.6  
For the same reasons, in this paper we also do not consider the issue of heterogeneity in the 
responses of house prices to school quality depending on buyers' or neighbourhood characteristics. 
These are endogenous in house price regression models in the presence of sorting, and cannot be 
simply added to empirical specifications in interaction with school quality. 
The second consequence of sorting on school quality is that it makes it difficult to separate 
marginal willingness to pay for school quality from the marginal willingness to pay for neighbours' 
quality. In the presence of sorting, part (though clearly not all) of the association of between school 
quality and house prices works through its effect on neighbour quality, so estimates cannot be easily 
interpreted as WTP for school quality per se. Our robustness checks in this respect are limited to a 
control variable strategy in which many of the neighbourhood demographic controls are potentially 
endogenous. Nevertheless, we will demonstrate that our estimates of the value of school quality are 
steadfastly linked directly to school attributes, and in this control function context, not to 
neighbourhood quality. 
3. Institutional Context and Data 
Before presenting our results in the next Section of the paper, we offer a description of England‟s 
primary schooling system in more detail. We also discuss the data sources that we use to implement 
our work and the empirical specifications that we consider. 
                                                 
6 The authors find a house price response of approximately 2.5% for a one standard deviation change in test scores in their 
'standard' hedonic models, which rises to around 3% when accounting for the effects of sorting.      
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National curriculum and assessment in England 
Compulsory education in England is organised into five stages referred to as Key Stages. In the 
primary phase, pupils enter school at age 4-5 in the Foundation Stage then move on to Key Stage 1 
(ks1), spanning ages 5-6 and 6-7. At age 7-8 pupils move to Key Stage 2, sometimes – but not usually 
– with a change of school.7 At the end of Key Stage 2 (ks2), when they are 10-11, children leave the 
primary phase and go on to secondary school where they progress through Key Stage 3 and 4. At the 
end of each Key Stage, in May, pupils are assessed on the basis of standard national tests, and progress 
through the phases is measured in terms of Key Stage Levels, ranging between W (working towards 
Level 1) and Level 5+ in the primary phase. A point system can also be applied to convert these levels 
into scores that represent about one term‟s (10-12 weeks) progress. 
Since 1996, in the autumn of each year, the results of the National Curriculum assessment at Key 
Stage 2 are published as a guide to primary school performance. More recently, since 2003, a value-
added score has also been reported, based on the average pupil gain at each school between age 7 and 
age 11 (relative to the national average). Schools and Local Education Authorities report these 
performance figures in their admissions documents, and parents refer to these documents and the 
performance tables, as well as using word-of-mouth recommendations, when choosing schools (see, 
inter alia, Flatley et al., 2001 and Gibbons and Silva, 2011). 
In our empirical work below, we use the ks1 to ks2 value-added score (va) as the main indicator 
of schools‟ production output, or effectiveness. On the other hand, we treat ks1 scores as a general 
control for pupils‟ prior academic achievements, i.e. mainly as a measure of school inputs in terms of 
the educational advantages embodied in the composition of its pupil intake. These ks1 tests might, at 
least in part, reflect the effectiveness of a school in children‟s early years. However, they are not 
publicly available and so cannot provide parents with a direct signal of school performance. Thus, we 
treat ks1 scores as mainly capturing information about school composition that parents can only learn 
                                                 
7 In some cases there are separate Infants and Junior schools (covering Key Stage 1 and 2 respectively) and a few LAs still 
operate a Middle School system (bridging the primary and secondary phases); we do not consider these schools here. 
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about from school visits, word of mouth, and using local knowledge.8 Our results in the following 
sections confirm that ks1 test scores are predominantly linked to students‟ background characteristics 
and in particular students'  eligibility for free meals (a proxy for low family income). Moreover, note 
that if there were significant benefits to be had from schoolmates with higher mean prior achievements 
(ks1) operating through peer effects, these would be capitalised in house prices via school average 
value-added. Thus, conditional on school effectiveness (va), a significant response of house prices to 
school composition is more likely to indicate parental demand for peer quality as a consumption (non-
productive) good. Finally, one further justification for focusing on ks1 scores as an indicator of 
background (rather than directly on free school meal eligibility) is that the coefficient on value-added 
conditional on ks1 in our regressions can be easily interpreted in terms of pupil progress or final 
achievement.  
School types and admissions 
All state primary schools in England are funded largely by central government, through Local 
Authorities (LAs, formerly Local Education Authorities) that are responsible for schools in their 
geographical domain. These schools fall into a number of different categories, and differ in terms of 
the way they are governed and who controls pupil admissions.9 Most primary schools (roughly two-
thirds) are termed 'Community' schools and are closely controlled by the LA. Other types of school, 
instead, are usually linked to a Faith or other charitable organisation, and more autonomously run. The 
key difference relevant to this paper is between schools that administer their own admissions and 
make their own choices on whom to admit – which we term autonomous schools – and non-
autonomous schools such as Community schools to which pupils are assigned by the Local Authority. 
                                                 
8 Note however that performance tables contain information on the fraction of students with special education needs (SEN), 
with varying degrees of severity. SEN status is partly based on poor performance in early tests and assessments. Thus 
parents can gather some indirect information about the intake quality of a school using performance tables. 
9 LAs are responsible for the strategic management of state education services, including planning the supply of school 
places, intervening where a school is failing and allocating central funding to schools. In addition there is a small private, 
fee-paying sector, which we do not consider here. Private schools educate around 6-7% of pupils in England as a whole. 
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Gibbons et al. (2008) provide more details on the overall differences between these two groups of 
schools. 
Regarding pupil admissions, overall, all LAs and schools must organise their arrangements in 
accordance with the current (now statutory) School Admissions Code. The guiding principle is that 
parental choice should be the first consideration when ranking applications to a primary school. 
However, if the number of applicants exceeds the number of available places, almost any criterion, 
which is not discriminatory, does not involve selection by ability and can be clearly assessed by 
parents, can be used to prioritise applicants. These criteria vary in detail, and change over time, but 
preference in non-autonomous schools is usually given first to children with special educational needs, 
next to children with siblings in the school and, crucially, to those children who live closest. For Faith 
and other autonomous schools, regular attendance at designated churches and other expressions of 
religious commitment are of foremost importance. Place of residence, in contrast, almost never 
features as a criterion. Even then, if place of residence is important for admission, it relates to Diocese 
boundaries, which do not follow administrative and school admission boundaries. Consequently, there 
is little reason for parents to pay for homes close to good autonomous schools, other than to reduce 
travel costs.  
There is however one additional crucial feature of the admission system that applies to non-
autonomous, but not to autonomous schools, and that we exploit in our empirical work. Pupils rarely 
attend non-autonomous schools outside of their LA of residence. Families are allowed to apply to non-
autonomous schools in other LAs, but up until recently (and during the period we consider in our 
empirical work) parents had to make separate applications to different LAs. More importantly, LAs do 
not have a statutory requirement to find a school for pupils from other school districts: the law only 
requires that they provide enough schools for pupils in “their area”.10 As a result, banking on 
                                                 
10 More precisely, the Education Act 1996 section 14 reads: “(1) A Local Education Authority shall secure that sufficient 
schools for providing (a) Primary education, and (b) education that is Secondary education (…) for their area. (2) The 
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admission to a popular non-autonomous school in another LA is a high-risk strategy and LA 
boundaries act as admissions district boundaries over the period we study. This provides a source of 
discontinuity in the non-autonomous school 'quality' that residents can access on different sides of  LA 
boundaries. In contrast, these barriers are much less relevant for admission to Faith schools and other 
autonomous schools that manage their own admissions. In Section 4.2 below, we will provide clear 
and compelling evidence that LA boundaries significantly affect non-autonomous school attendance 
patterns, and that there is a discrete jump in the probability of attending schools in a given admission 
district as one moves from a residence on one side to a residence on the other side of a boundary. 
Source data 
In our analysis we combine information obtained from three different data sources. Our source of price 
information is the “Price-paid” dataset from the UK Land Registry for the years 2000-2006. This is an 
administrative dataset that records the address, sales price and characteristics (property type, new or 
old build, freehold or leasehold) of all domestic properties sold in the UK. Each property is located by 
its address postcode – typically 15 neighbouring addresses – and each postcode can be assigned to a 1 
metre coordinate on the British National Grid system using the National Statistics Postcode Directory. 
Information on school quality and characteristics comes from the UK's Department for Children, 
Schools and Families (DCSF). The DCSF collects a variety of census data on state-school pupils 
centrally, because the pupil assessment system is used to publish school performance tables and 
because information on pupil numbers and characteristics is necessary for administrative purposes – in 
particular to determine funding. A National Pupil Database exists since 1996 holding information on 
each pupil's assessment record in the Key Stage Assessments throughout their school career. Since 
2002, a Pupil Level Annual Census (PLASC) records information on pupil's school, gender, age, 
ethnicity, language skills, any special educational needs or disabilities, entitlement to free school 
                                                                                                                                                                
schools available for an area shall not be regarded as sufficient (…) unless they are sufficient in number, character and 
equipment to provide for all pupils the opportunity of appropriate education”. 
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meals and various other pieces of information including postcode of residence. PLASC is integrated 
with the pupil's assessment record in the National Pupil Database (NPD), giving a large and detailed 
dataset on pupils along with their test histories. Additional institutional characteristics and expenditure 
information on schools is obtained from “Edubase” data, from the Annual School Census and from the 
Consistent Financial Reporting series that can be obtained from the DCSF.  
Finally, neighbourhood characteristics from the 2001 GB Census at Output Area level are linked 
to the Price-paid housing transactions data by their address postcode. We also compute various 
geographical attributes such as distances to LA boundaries and distances between properties using a 
Geographical Information System (GIS).  
Linking the schools data to housing sales is more complex, since there is no predefined mapping 
between a house sale, i.e. its postcode, and the set of schools that are accessible from that location. We 
infer this mapping from actual home-school travel-patterns using a computationally intensive, but 
intuitively simple procedure as described in the next section. 
Linking schools to housing transactions and matching across boundaries 
One of the innovations in this work is the accurate assignment of school quality to house location in 
institutional settings such as ours, where there is no one-to-one mapping between where a child lives 
and the school he or she attends. The procedure entails imputation of the set of schools accessible from 
each postcode in our Land Registry housing transactions database using the attendance patterns of 
pupils that are recorded in the National Pupil Database. This approach is much more sophisticated than 
the common approach of simply assigning a house to the nearest school or set of schools, and is 
essential when we want to exploit boundary discontinuities generated by Local Authorities. Defining 
catchment areas from 'revealed preferences' in this way implicitly accounts for features of school 
choice and attendance patterns that would be obscured by simpler assignment rules. 
In our revealed preference procedure, we start by estimating the approximate shape of the 
catchment area for each school using the residential addresses (postcode) of pupils in the year when 
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they start at the school. This shape is delineated by the 75th percentile of the home-to-school distance 
in each of 10 sectors radiating from each school location (starting West and moving anticlockwise). 
Each of the 10 sectors is drawn to capture 10% of the school's intake. This procedure relaxes 
constraints on the shape of catchment areas, allowing for geographically asymmetric patterns of 
attendance with sufficient flexibility to apply our boundary discontinuity design. The reason we 
truncate the catchment areas at the 75th percentile home-school distance in each direction is to remove 
outliers that could artificially inflate the size of the imputed school catchment areas. Discarding these 
outliers reduces the likelihood that we erroneously draw catchment areas across LA boundaries, and 
ensures that we focus on areas in which there is a high chance of admission – a consideration which is 
paramount to home buyers seeking to get their children into a particular school (and thus to our 
research). Note that we experimented with various distance thresholds, as well as with overlapping 
fixed interval radial sectors and alternative starting points and orientations, with little effect on the 
results. 
Before moving on, let us emphasise why this shaping procedure is necessary by considering some 
alternatives. Suppose we simply assigned the quality of the nearest school to each housing transaction, 
or arbitrarily drew a circular catchment area around each school. To implement a boundary 
discontinuity strategy, we would need to artificially impose the constraint that a student in a house on 
one side of an administrative attendance district boundary (i.e. the LA boundary) can not attend their 
nearest school if it lies on the other side. Without this restriction, the set of schools available close to 
an admissions zone boundary, but on opposite sides of it, would be nearly identical to each other. 
Hence, there would be no source of variation in school quality for identification in the boundary 
discontinuity model (violating Assumption A2). On the other hand, we would not want to impose this 
constraint if the discontinuity did not actually exist. Our imputation procedure does not force any such 
truncation of the catchment area at the boundary unless it is supported by the spatial distribution of 
pupil homes in relation the schools they attend. Stated differently, we allow our de-facto catchment 
areas of schools close to the LA boundaries to be truncated and shrunk in the direction of the 
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boundaries – as well as in any other areas and trajectories – only when the data reveal that this is the 
'right' pattern. 
After creating each school-specific catchment area definition, we calculate the distance and 
direction from each school to each housing transaction in our Land Registry housing transactions 
database (up to a maximum distance of 10km). It is then straightforward to link each house to multiple 
schools by deducing which housing transactions lie within which school catchment areas. Following 
that, we calculate variables summarising the set of schools that are accessible from a given housing 
transaction postcode in a given year, by averaging the characteristics of the schools to which a house is 
linked. Note that we average using higher weights on the closest schools to each house, although 
results are similar when using un-weighted means. In carrying out this aggregation we maintain the 
distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous schools. So, for example, a housing transaction 
is assigned the mean value-added of local non-autonomous schools and the mean value-added of 
autonomous schools as separate variables.  
We also take care to correctly organise the timing of events in our data. The pupil census in 
England occurs in January, pupils take their ks1 and ks2 assessments in May, and the results are 
published towards the end of the calendar year. We therefore link prices of houses sold in calendar 
year t (January to December) to the test results and census figures published at the end of year t-1 (in 
October to November). 
The procedure described above yields a large dataset of over 1.6 million housing sales for 2003, 
2004, 2005 and 2006 joined to data on the average characteristics of the set of schools that can be 
accessed from the postcode of each sale. To set up the spatially differenced cross-boundary model in 
Equation (2) we reduce our sample to the set of sales occurring within 2500m of a LA (attendance 
district) boundary. We then find, for each transaction, the nearest sale in the same year of the same 
property type, occurring in an adjacent LA, within the median inter-property distance across that 
specific boundary (method M2 in Section 2.3). This means that a given housing sale can provide a 
'match'  for multiple housing sales. Note that property type here is defined by detached, semi-
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detached, terraced or flats, and by ownership type, i.e. leasehold or freehold. Further, the restriction on 
matching within median distance along a boundary ensures that we do not create any matched pairs 
that are excessively far apart, given the actual density of houses in the local area. For part of the 
empirical analysis, we further employ the subset of boundaries that do not coincide with major roads, 
motorways and railways (see method M7). To achieve this, we use a GIS ' intersection' tool and 
identify which sections of the LA boundaries coincide with one of these features. We then drop those 
properties for which this portion of boundary is the closest section of the LA border. For reasons 
explained in Section 2.3, we also set up a set of matched sales across 'fake' LA boundaries and a set of 
matched sales within LAs (method M8). To produce the first sample, we simply translate the 
geographical coordinates of the housing transactions data by 10km North and 10km East, and repeat 
the matching exercise. For the second, we repeat the matching exercise but impose the constraint that 
the matched sale is within the same LA and at least 20m away to achieve better comparability with the 
cross-LA samples. 
Empirical specification 
Applying the data described above to the models of Equations (1) and (2) yields empirical 
specifications of the form: 
 1 2 1hi i i i hi i hip va ks z x g c            (3) 
 1 2 1hi i i i hi i hip va ks z x g c                
In equation (3), hip  is the (log) price of the house sale h  in location i ; iva  is the expected value-
added and 1iks is the mean age 7 test score (our marker for background and prior achievement), for 
schools that can be accessed from location i  (measured at periods prior to the house transaction); the 
vector iz  contains other observable school and neighbourhood characteristics; vector hx  contains 
observable attributes of house sale h ; and the function  ig c  represents unobserved neighbourhood 
characteristics and amenities (other than schooling) that affect market prices. We parameterise  ig c  
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using boundary dummy variables, distance to school, distance between matched transactions and 
various distance-to-boundary polynomials. As usual, i  represents unobserved housing attributes and 
errors that are independent of all other factors (i.e. 'noise') . The notation   means a difference 
between matched, closest transactions on either side of the LA boundary. 
Although we have house sales and school attributes in multiple periods, we have suppressed the t-
subscripts for simplicity. Variation over time in the cross-boundary differences in school quality 
contributes to identification, but we do not exploit the time dimension alone in our estimation strategy. 
Three reasons for this decision are: (a) test scores assigned to house postcodes are highly correlated 
from one period to the next so that the within-place, between-period variance in school quality is very 
low; (b) we have only 3 full years (2003, 2004 and 2005) and one quarter (quarter 1 of 2006) of 
housing transactions linked schools data; and (c) response of prices to changes is likely to display 
inertia and be sluggish. These factors mean we cannot use changes over time alone as a basis for 
identification. In the next section we present results from regression estimates of the models in (3) 
obtained by pooling all available time periods. 
4. Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents some key descriptive statistics. The first two columns summarise the full data set of 
housing transactions and associated school characteristics from 2003-2006. The second two columns 
present comparable statistics for our boundary sub-sample of sales, described in the Data section 
above. The average price of sales in the transactions data set is £182,730. In the boundary sub-sample 
the mean is about £13,000, or 7% higher. This is because administrative boundaries are more prevalent 
in and around towns and cities and hence we pick up more urban transactions in the boundary sub-
sample. In addition, there is a greater chance of finding matched pairs of sales across sections of the 
boundaries in urban areas, where housing is denser. It is easy to visualise this in Figure 1, which plots 
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the locations of transactions in the boundary sub-sample for two arbitrarily chosen geographical areas: 
the Midlands, North West and South Yorkshire (Panel A); and London and the South East (Panel B). 
The figure illustrates a general spread of sales throughout England' s cities and towns, but in a way that 
is governed by the administrative boundary structure. 
In terms of school test scores, value-added is higher in the boundary sub-sample and ks1scores are 
lower, but the differences are relatively small. Houses in this sub-sample have slightly fewer 
accessible schools (where accessibility is imputed from travel patterns described in the Data section 
above). This difference is in accordance with our claim that LA boundaries restrict the choice set for 
houses located close to the boundary (see the discussion above and Gibbons et al., 2008). Schools also 
tend to be closer to home in the boundary sub-sample, again reflecting the relatively urban nature of 
the sample. 
For the boundary group, we also present some statistics on the distance to the closest boundary 
and the distance between property pairs that are matched across boundaries. The raw mean distance to 
the boundary is nearly 500 metres, and the raw average distance between matched properties is just 
under 725 metres. These figures look high in comparison with previous studies that focus on city 
neighbourhoods only, but are not so large in the light of the general geographical spread illustrated in 
Figure 1. In our regressions, we apply inverse inter-sale distance weights, so the inverse distance 
weighted (IDW) means provide a better representation of the effective boundary difference relevant to 
our regressions. The effective mean distance to the boundary in the weighted sample is much lower at 
only 133m, and the weighted inter-sale distance is similarly low at only 206m. 
Evaluating the boundary discontinuities 
As discussed at length in Section 2.2, a pre-requisite of our method is that a discontinuity exists in 
school quality at LA boundaries (or in the school quality households expect to be able to access; see 
Assumption A2). As a preliminary step, we show that cross-district school attendance is much less 
prevalent than within-district attendance, even close to district boundaries. The relevant figures are 
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presented in Table 2 and refer to proportions in the postcode. In the full dataset, only 3.3% of pupils 
attend schools other than in their home LAs, though this is not surprising given that, on average, 
schools in other LAs will be further away. In the boundary sub-sample the proportion rises to 6.2%, 
while the IDW mean proportion crossing from each residential postcode in our sales data (given that 
the postcode has any children of primary school entry age) is 25%. Since this figure corresponds to 
addresses only 133m from the boundary (Table 1), we would expect nearly 50% chances of attending 
a school on either side of the boundary if this did not impose a 'barrier'  and was unimportant for 
admission. Moreover, these means are from distributions that are highly right-skewed and the median 
proportion of pupils attending a school in a district different is zero. Clearly, then, LA boundaries 
create a strong impediment to school choice. This is fully consistent with the results using boundary 
discontinuities to identify the causal impact of school choice and competition on pupil achievement in 
Gibbons et al. (2008) (see also Card et al., 2010). 
More explicit tests for discontinuities in school quality and other area characteristics at the LA 
boundary are provided in Figure 2 and Figure 3 (using method M1 of Section 2.3). In all these figures, 
the x-axis reports the distance from a property transaction to the LA boundary. The right hand side of 
the diagram (distance > 0) corresponds to sales which have access to greater school value-added than 
their match across the boundary, i.e.     0i js c s c   in Equation (2). On the other hand, the left side 
of the diagram (distance < 0) corresponds to cases where access is to schools with value-added below 
that on the other side of the boundary. The plots are obtained as predictions from a regression of the 
cross-boundary difference in the relevant variable, on a positive side and negative side constant term, 
and 18 distance-decile dummies, up to 800m from the boundary on each side. The dependent variables 
are standardised by the standard deviation of the cross-boundary difference within 800m. The dotted 
lines show 95% confidence intervals. The plots are restricted to 400m on each side for clarity, and 
shown alongside a test for whether the differences on both sides at the boundary are equal (i.e. an F-
test of the hypothesis that the absolute values of the positive and negative constants in the regressions 
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are equal to one another). Note that the reason why these graphs are not necessarily symmetric is that a 
sale i on the 'good'  side of the boundary may be matched with its closest sale j on the 'bad'  side of the 
boundary, but sale j may in turn be matched to another sale k on the ' good ' side of the (same or a 
different) boundary if j is closer to k than i. Note also that it is simply an artefact of the construction of 
the graphs that the lines do not reach the boundary, because the first point on the horizontal axis is the 
mean distance of the first decile of housing transactions, ranked by distance to the boundary. Finally, 
the standard errors are clustered on location jc  to allow for repeated matches of the same sale j to 
multiple sales i, and for a degree of arbitrary spatial correlation in the error term. 
The top left panel of Figure 2 shows a large and sharp discontinuity in value-added scores at LA 
boundaries for non-autonomous schools, making it clear that we have substantial variation in our main 
school performance measure across boundaries (Assumption A2). The overall scale of the difference 
within the 400 metres of the boundary is unsurprising given this is the variable on which the right and 
left halves of the plot are defined. However, the most important point here is that almost half of the 2-
standard deviation spread occurs within the first 100m, from where our identification will 
predominantly come. The top right panel shows that a discontinuity in house sale prices exists too: 
although visually this looks small, the difference across the boundary is highly significant, and the 
price on the ' good ' boundary side is higher than the price on the ' bad ' boundary side at every 
corresponding distance. Rough visual comparison of the top left and right panels suggests that a 0.8 
standard deviation change in school average value-added is associated with a 0.05 standard deviation 
change in house prices at the boundary. As we move away from the boundary, focussing on more 
widely spaced properties, we see that prices tend not to follow school average value-added. This 
occurs because many other amenities drive these spatial price trends, illustrating the importance of 
weighting our regression estimates to close-neighbour observations, and controlling for distance-to-
boundary trends (methods M3 and M5 in Section 2.3). 
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In the lower two panels of Figure 2, we look at the corresponding cross-boundary discontinuity 
picture for autonomous school quality. In these graphs, the right hand side corresponds to places with 
relatively high autonomous school quality (and vice versa for the left hand side). Again, there is by 
definition a strong rise in school quality across the boundary. However, there is neither a sizable nor a 
significant discontinuity in house prices at the boundary in this institutional context, where admission 
to school is not linked to where pupils live. In fact the p-value of the F-test (= 0.76) shows that one 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cross-boundary difference in house prices. 
In Figure 3 we present similar pictures for a range of neighbourhood-related characteristics, with 
left and right sides split by low and high non-autonomous school average value-added. These plots 
serve to show to what extent cross-boundary neighbourhood differences are correlated with cross-
boundary non-autonomous school value-added differences. It is evident that there are no 
discontinuities in terms of a wide range of neighbourhood characteristics (obtained from the 2001 GB 
census and the Land Registry data), including the share of local dwellings sold per year (only 
marginally significant at less than 5% level), the dwelling size and residents' characteristics. One 
exception is the proportion high-qualified residents (degrees and equivalent), in which there is a 
statistically significant break. The fact that more highly educated residents live on the side of the 
boundary with good schools is evidence for some degree sorting of those with higher incomes and 
stronger preferences for their children's education (similar results are found in Bayer at al., 2007). The 
empirical issues arising from this kind of sorting were discussed in 2.4, and will be addressed in our 
robustness checks presented in Section 4.6. In Figure 3, we also show that there are no significant 
differences in the average distance to schools or the number of schools accessible from a postcode of 
residence (i.e. the number of catchment areas encompassing the address) between the 'good'  and  'bad'
sides of the boundaries. This greatly allays any concern about travel costs or the degree of choice 
differing on opposite side of LA borders. Some interesting features here are that the average travel 
distance to schools accessible from an area increases towards the boundary (on both the 'good'  and 
'bad' sides), and that areas have fewer accessible schools if they are close to the boundaries. We 
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exploited these features of England's school district boundaries in our previous paper on school choice 
competition (Gibbons et al., 2008). 
Baseline results: comparing the price effects of school value-added and prior achievements 
Table 3 presents the coefficients and standard errors for our main regression results. We report only 
the key figures for the house price effects of school-mean value-added ( 'output' ) and ks1 test scores, 
which we argue proxy for school 'inputs' (i.e. measures of pupil background and school composition). 
The reported coefficients are multiplied by 100 so as to show, to an approximation, the percentage 
effect of a one point change in school mean test scores. Control variables are listed in the table notes. 
The specifications become increasingly stringent as we move left to right across the Table. Column (1) 
reports results from a simple OLS regression using the full time-pooled cross-sectional samples for 
2002-2006 (i.e. Equation (3)); Column (2) shows the same specification estimated on the boundary 
sub-sample (see Section 3.4) and Column (3) is the cross-boundary (method M2) pair-wise differenced 
model described in Section 2.3. Columns (4) to (8) introduce the other modifications described in 
Section 2.3, by adding inverse distance weighting (M3), LA boundary dummies (M4), distance-to-
boundary polynomial trends (M5), by restricting to boundaries with below-median rates of crossing 
(M6) and, finally, by eliminating cases where boundaries coincide with geographical features (M7).  
Let us focus first on the price effects of value-added. In the simple OLS estimates, we observe 
very large and significant associations between school value-added and house prices, with a one point 
change linked to an 11-14% change in prices (8-11% for a one standard deviation change in the school 
average value-added distribution). These results should not be trusted as causal estimates: as soon as 
we eliminate common neighbourhood factors using the boundary differencing strategy there is a 
dramatic fall in the price effect of school value-added, down to 2% in Column (3). However, we have 
argued that the effects of school quality are only separately identified from neighbourhood influences 
when the distance between matched sales is zero. Therefore, a more reliable estimate is the one 
presented in Column (4), where we apply IDW weights to the regressions. This shows that the 
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coefficient on value-added rises considerably, up to 3.8%, and becomes more statistically significant. 
Note that if we follow the strategy of Black (1999) and only concentrate on the closest properties pairs 
(that is, we apply weights of 1 to transactions within a threshold distance, and weights of 0 otherwise) 
we find similar results. For example, when we restrict our sample to transaction pairs less than 
250metres apart (sample size 16,515) we find a point estimate of 3.89, with a standard error of 1.45. 
An important result is that once we have applied IDW weights, the coefficient on value-added 
remains very stable at around 3.7% (or 3% for one standard deviation) even when we add in boundary 
dummy variables (Column (5)), and distance-to-boundary polynomials (Column (6)). We can further 
include boundary × year dummies, instead of simple boundary dummies, to eliminate all time-series 
variation occurring along boundaries and the coefficients are almost unchanged (3.74 on va and 2.75 
on ks1). Similarly, the results change only slightly when we restrict our analysis to boundaries with 
low rates of crossing (below median, or less than 5% of pupils crossing along the whole boundary) as 
in Column (7), or eliminate cases where the LA boundaries coincide with major roads, motorways or 
railways as in Column (8). The size of the house price response sits comfortably with previous results 
in the literature, surveyed by Gibbons and Machin (2008) and Black and Machin (2010), which shows 
a consensus estimate of around 3-4% house price premium for one standard deviation increase in 
school average test scores. 
Note that other weighting schemes, for example ijde where ijd  is the distance between transaction 
i and matched transaction j, produce similar results. Additionally, we have experimented with a 
number of formulations for distance-to-boundary polynomials too, coming to almost identical 
conclusions. These included: simple difference-in-distance-polynomials (as reported in Table 3); 
separate polynomials in the distance on the i (source) and j (matched) sides of the boundary; separate 
polynomials in the distance of the 'good'  and 'bad'  sides of the boundary (i.e. an interaction between 
distance polynomials and an indicator for high or low school value-added). Finally, if we include 
interactions between distance-to-boundary and boundary dummies, allowing for 680 boundary side 
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specific trends, we find a slightly lower, but still highly significant coefficient on value-added. All in 
all, our most robust and testing specifications indicate that prices rise by about 3.7-3.8% for a one 
point increase in school value-added from the mean (about 3% for a one standard deviation change in 
the school average value-added distribution). 
Our results also point to a significant relationship between early test scores and housing costs. 
The OLS results on the full sample show a 3.7% change in prices for a one point change in ks1 test 
scores. Once we focus our attention to the boundary sample and apply IDW weights, the effect is 
reduced, but remains significant and suggests a price response of around 2.8% for a one point 
improvement (again, about 3% for a one standard deviation change in the school average age 7 test 
scores distribution). As already mentioned, the interpretation we place on this coefficient is that it 
measures the house price response due to parental demand for peer quality, irrespective of its impact 
on test score progression. Comparing the response to value-added and age 7 scores, it is evident that 
school choice is driven by the demand both for expected academic gain and for aspects of expected 
peer group quality that are uncorrelated with current academic gains (i.e. school intake composition 
conditional on school value-added). The net result is that house prices respond to mean age 11 test 
scores, whether or not these arise through school composition or school value-added.  
An alternative interpretation is that ks1 achievements measure pre-age 7 school value-added, 
although a number of factors count against this interpretation. Firstly, cross-boundary differences in 
pupil background characteristics – i.e. free-meal entitlement, ethnicity and special educational needs – 
account for 40% of the variance in cross-boundary differences in ks1 achievements. On the other hand, 
cross-boundary differences in value-added and cross-boundary differences in ks1 only share 2.9% of 
their variance (i.e. the square of the correlation between va and ks1 is 0.029). Therefore, pupil 
background is the main observable component in the variation of the ks1 test scores included in the 
regressions reported in Table 3. Secondly, as we will show in Section 4.6, the effect of ks1 is fully 
eliminated when we include school intake characteristics in our specification. In short, age 7 test 
scores are almost certainly proxying for the background characteristics of the school intake, and not 
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for pre-age 7 teaching quality and 'school effectiveness' in general. We will return to this point in 
Section 4.6 and in our Conclusions. 
In conclusion to these baseline results, it is worth noting that previous research (Kane et al., 2003 
and Gibbons and Machin, 2003) has suggested that single-year test scores could be noisy proxies for 
the long-run performance indicators in which parents are likely to be interested. This could lead to 
underestimate the response of prices to expected school performance. In this research, we considered 
this possibility by using two-year averaged test scores in our regressions, but found no evidence that 
using single-year performance measures attenuates our coefficients. In addition, given the institutional 
uncertainty over where a child will go to school (since de jure catchment areas do not exist), there may 
be concerns that this implies a form of measurement error which downward biases our estimates. To 
test for this possibility, we split the sample into a subset of properties in our de facto catchment areas 
where there is low cross-sectional (i.e. across accessible schools) dispersion in test scores at ks2, and a 
subset of properties in which there is high variance across accessible schools. This partition is obtained 
by selecting areas below and above the median of the coefficient of variation of ks2, i.e. under the 
maintained assumption that all the schools to which a child could be admitted have similar scores. If 
uncertainty in admissions downward biases our estimates, we would expect to find lower coefficients 
in the high-variability catchment areas. However, the effects turn out to be very similar in both cases. 
In low variability areas, we estimate a coefficient of 3.09 (s.e. 0.98) on value-added, and 2.27 (s.e. 
0.93) on ks1. The corresponding values in high variability areas are 3.30 (s.e. 1.10) and 3.13 (s.e. 
1.07), and so, if anything, marginally higher in areas where school quality is more uncertain.  
Falsification tests using imaginary boundaries and inoperative boundaries 
In Table 4, we implement the first of our falsification tests based on imaginary boundaries, described 
as Method 8 in Section 2.3. In the first instance, in Columns (1) to (3), we simply pair sales up with 
other sales within the same LA, imposing a minimum distance between the matched properties of 20m 
to achieve better comparability with the actual cross-LA sample. A similar test was carried out in 
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Black (1999). In Column (1), we present the OLS estimates for comparison. In Column (2), we present 
the coefficients based on the differenced data, while in Column (3) we introduce our IDW weighting. 
Note that we cannot include LA boundary dummies or distance to boundary polynomials in these 
models, since no boundaries are involved. OLS estimates are similar to what we found before on the 
full sample. However, when we difference between close-neighbour pairs within the same LA we find 
no house price effects associated with local schools. This suggests that our findings above are not 
spuriously driven by local unobservables, rather causally linked to cross-boundary school quality 
discontinuities.  
The specifications based on paired differences across  'fake' LA boundaries – re-drawn by 
translating the coordinates of housing transactions 10km North and East – tell a similar story. In 
Column (4), we report simple OLS estimates for comparison. In Column (5), we difference the data 
across fake LA boundaries, and then go on to apply IDW weights to our regressions (Column (6)) and 
to include LA boundary dummies and distance-to-boundary trends (Column (7)). The change as we 
move from Column (4) to (6) is dramatic and illustrates the importance of IDW weighting in our 
boundary discontinuity design: the simple boundary discontinuity estimates in Column (5) still suggest 
a significant association of house prices with ks1 test scores, even when no discontinuity should exist 
between the school quality assigned to the close-neighbour housing sales pairs (i.e. a similar set of 
schools could be accessed from both sides of the fake boundary, since these do not act as real barriers). 
When we apply IDW weights, the coefficients are greatly attenuated and become completely 
statistically insignificant. In other words, these tests do not falsify our claim that there exists a causal 
effect on house prices arising from the demand for school quality, when admission is constrained by 
real attendance boundaries. Moreover, they provide further support for our use of IDW weighted 
regressions. 
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Falsification tests using schools which do not admit pupils based on home location 
One way to falsify our findings would be to show that house prices respond to the quality of schools 
that do not ration places according to home address. Our institutional set up allows us to implement 
this test, as described in Section 2.3 and Section 3.2, using the characteristics of autonomous schools 
vis-à-vis those of non-autonomous schools. Hence, in Table 5, we compare the effect of school quality 
on house prices for these two types of institutions (method M9). The first two rows present again the 
association of house prices with quality in non-autonomous schools, which admit pupils according to 
home address (i.e. the set of schools used so far for our baseline results). The second two rows show 
the coefficients for autonomous schools for which home-to-school distance is not an important 
admission criteria.  
In the OLS estimates presented in Columns (1) and (2), we find that the association between 
school quality and housing prices is large and significant for both types of school, indicating that these 
coefficients are unlikely to represent causal effects running from school quality to housing demand. In 
fact, the only reason to buy very close to autonomous schools is to minimise transport costs (not to 
grant admission). Therefore, the association between autonomous school quality and house prices 
most likely reflects a reverse-causal relationship between local family incomes (driven by differences 
in neighbourhood amenities, such as access to better transport) and average academic achievement in 
schools that pupils from these families attend. In contrast, as soon as we difference across LA 
boundaries, we find positive and significant results for non-autonomous schools as we did before, but 
very small and insignificant results for autonomous schools – especially when we weight the estimates 
towards the closest sales pairs (see Columns (3) and (4)). A joint test for the coefficients on value-
added and age 7 test scores in Column (4) being equal for autonomous and non-autonomous schools 
clearly rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.025. 
Once concern is that, given the availability of these two types of schooling, our estimates of the 
non-autonomous school effects might be attenuated by a tendency for shrewd parents, seeking 
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admission to popular autonomous schools, to buy cheaper housing on those sides of LA boundaries 
that provide low non-autonomous school quality, and then to  'cross' the boundary to attend an 
autonomous school. Under this scenario, autonomous schools might raise housing prices when non-
autonomous quality is low. However, in Column (5) we show that interactions between autonomous 
and non-autonomous school quality are not significantly linked to prices either, making this hypothesis 
highly unlikely. 
Robustness of the results to sorting, neighbourhood attributes and school resources 
Section 2.4 highlighted the problems associated with inferring mean social valuations of amenities 
(willingness to pay) such as school quality when households are heterogeneous and there is sorting on 
school quality according to household type. Figure 3 further showed that some such sorting exists 
across LA boundaries in our data, although only for high-qualified residents. To address these issues, 
in Table 6, we check the robustness of our effects to the inclusion of a variety of neighbourhood 
demographic controls (at Output Area level, the smallest geographical unit in the GB 2001 Census 
containing on average 125 households). We focus in particular on the importance of highly qualified 
neighbours with degrees and equivalent qualifications, and of those without qualifications. It should be 
noted these neighbourhood variables are potentially endogenous in housing price models, because 
unobserved amenities simultaneously raise housing prices and generate residential sorting. 
Column (1) simply repeats our preferred specification from Table 3, while Column (2) adds in a 
control for the proportion of highly qualified and the proportion of unqualified neighbours. Both enter 
the regression with the expected signs and are jointly highly significant, suggesting that households 
value the educational status of their neighbours (similar to Gibbons, 2003). However, controlling for 
neighbours' educational qualifications makes very little difference to the coefficients on school 
quality. In Column (3) and (4), we go one step further by first adding a range of other demographic 
controls (Column (3)), and then including the average school achievements of children in the 
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residential neighbourhood (Column (4)).11 The coefficients on school quality change relatively little, 
in particular the one capturing the response of house prices to school value-added. This is particularly 
reassuring since it shows that school effectiveness is capitalised into house prices over and above the 
educational progress of pupils living in the same neighbourhood. Finally, in Column (5), we subject 
our data to an even stronger test and match sales across LA boundaries according to whether they are 
in Census Output Areas in the same quartile of the distribution of high qualifications (in addition to 
matching on the standard set of housing characteristics). This process provides us with a considerably 
smaller sample of matched housing pairs, with consequent effects on the precision of our estimates. In 
fact, the coefficient on ks1 test scores is weakened considerably, which is consistent with our claim 
that early test scores act as a proxy for school composition, which is in turn dependent on 
neighbouring parents'  educational background. Nevertheless, our point estimates for school value-
added remain of a similar order of magnitude to our baseline findings, and confirm our results so far. 
Taken together, the evidence from Columns (1)-(5) in Table 6 suggests that the second order 
'multiplier' effect of school quality on neighbourhood quality operating through residential sorting is 
quite small and has little bearing on our valuation of school performance – especially the contribution 
of value-added. 
School financial resources also have a potential relationship with housing prices – through taxes 
and through family background linkages – and this is an issue that we have not discussed yet. In 
England, resources are allocated to LAs from central government grant on the basis of needs (mainly 
numbers of pupils, levels of income, disadvantage and special educational needs). However, LAs tend 
to distribute this grant to their schools simply on the basis of pupil numbers, with various other small 
payments and allowances for severe special educational needs (Sibieta et al., 2008). Most of the 
variation in school expenditure per pupil is therefore between-LAs, and hence taken out by our LA-
pair boundary dummies (method M4). It is however possible that resources are allocated to LAs in 
                                                 
11 We derive the mean age7-to-11 value-added and age-7 scores of pupils living in the neighbourhood from our pupil 
database. Neighbourhoods are defined as geographical areas that share the same three nearest schools. 
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response to changing area demographics over time, or that localised factors within LAs (e.g. parents' 
fund raising associations) generate some correlation between within-LA expenditure per pupil and 
within-LA house prices. 
To check the robustness of our findings against these issues, we continue Table 6 by introducing 
controls for school resources (pupil teacher ratio, expenditure per pupil and pupil numbers) along with 
a control for local housing tax rates (Column (6)), and by including those school demographic 
characteristics that affect school income (percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals, ethnic 
minority proportion and proportion with special educational needs; Column (7)). Clearly, from 
Column (6), school expenditures, pupil numbers and pupil-teacher ratios show no statistically 
significant association with prices. This result holds whether or not we control for school value-added 
or mean test scores, and/or if we replace total expenditure per pupil with sub-categories of spending.12 
More importantly, our key findings on value-added and age 7 test scores are largely unchanged. On 
the other hand, when we control for other aspects of school composition as in Column (7), the 
coefficient on age 7 school average test scores falls to near zero and is statistically insignificant. This 
is mainly because the income-related dimension of intake – namely the proportion of pupils eligible 
for free school meals – does a better job of measuring those dimensions of school composition that 
influence parental demand and thus house prices. Other aspects of school composition – ethnicity, 
special educational needs – turn out to be irrelevant. In contrast, although the coefficient on value-
added is attenuated slightly in this saturated model, it remains highly statistically significant and 
important in size, emphasising the crucial role of value-added in driving the house price response. 
5. Concluding Discussion 
The question of how much parents are willing to pay to get their children into what they perceive as 
better schools remains a high profile research and policy question. However, accurately pinning down 
                                                 
12 This is not surprising given what is known about the weak link between resources and performance that can be observed 
within cross-sectional data on state school systems. See among others Hanushek (2003) for an international survey and 
Levacic and Vignoles (2002) for a discussion of the UK experience. 
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the house price premium generated by superior school performance, and developing a better 
understanding of what aspects of performance parents most value, is hampered by a number of 
methodological difficulties and concerns.   
In this paper, our research aim was to go further than previous work in finding out if, why, and by 
how much people pay for homes near good schools. We started by defending and refining the 
' boundary discontinuity' approach to hedonic modelling, and established through a series of novel 
robustness checks and falsification tests that the methodology provides credible estimates of the causal 
links between school characteristics and housing prices. Our methodological extensions to the 
boundary discontinuity framework are of broader interest, in that they generalise to other contexts 
such as border effects in international trade (e.g. Redding and Sturm, 2008; Hanson, 2004), provision 
of health care (e.g. Propper et al., 2004; Propper et al., 2008), and the effects of local tax regimes and 
policies on housing costs and business location (e.g. Cushing, 1984; Holmes, 1998). These 
refinements include: pair-wise matching of observations across boundaries; controlling for unobserved 
boundary effects and spatial trends; geographically re-weighting our data towards transactions close to 
boundaries; eliminating boundaries that coincide with major geographical features; and setting up a 
'fake-boundary'  design by translating the geographical coordinates of the observations in our sample. 
A principal objective of this paper was to establish whether the well-documented response of 
housing prices to school-mean test scores represents a demand for educational outputs of schools. This 
is a crucial policy question, because it captures the value of educational performance arising, 
potentially, from teaching quality, leadership, quality and resources. The alternative explanation we 
considered is that prices rise in response to components of school quality that are uncorrelated with 
school value-added and hence unlikely to raise a child's achievements. These aspects of school quality 
are less amenable to policy intervention and have little or no bearing on educational effectiveness. 
Our results strongly show that households pay higher house prices for schools that are likely to 
raise their child's educational achievements – i.e. high value-added schools. In other words, 
households pay for what they see as the output of schooling in terms of expected educational progress. 
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The results also suggest that households pay an additional premium for a favourable distribution of 
pupil characteristics in these schools – which we represented by higher mean achievements at age 7. 
This premium this seems to be linked to the willingness of households to pay for a more favourable 
family income distribution in the school – namely, fewer children on free school meals – rather than 
school effectiveness at the earliest stages of education. On the other hand, ethnic mix in schools does 
not appear to have an important bearing on prices and the housing market reveals no preference for 
higher school expenditures, generally and on any specific resources, or preferences for smaller classes 
and schools. 
As it turns out, we are not completely able to say if households know exactly what they are paying 
for. The magnitudes of the effects of school composition and value-added on house prices are similar 
to each other, so a one point increase in school average test scores at age 11 is valued the same, 
irrespective of whether this is achieved through value-added or school composition. One potential 
explanation is that parents use the headline, end-of-primary test results as an indicator of academic 
effectiveness, but do not use other school-level information adequately to differentiate between school 
results that arise because of high school effectiveness, as captured by a higher value-added, and results 
that come about because the school is enrolling high achieving pupils from the start. An implication of 
this conjecture is that households are paying in part for aspects of schools that are unlikely to make 
much difference to their own child's achievement. Another possibility is that value-added is really just 
another dimension of school composition, reflecting the average rate of progress of pupils enrolling in 
a school, but unrelated to the expected gains the school would generate for a child picked at random. 
The implication then is that parents pay to access schools that admit fast-progressing pupils, even 
though these schools offer no obvious academic benefits to their own child. Both these scenarios seem 
theoretically and empirically unappealing. The most plausible explanation that is consistent with our 
results is that parents value both academic effectiveness and composition aspects of school quality, 
because they are interested in their own child's academic progress, as well as the social status of their 
child's peers. Either way, the statistical association between school value-added and house prices 
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seems empirically indestructible, regardless of what we do to control for school composition. This 
finding persuades us that parents really do care about value-added when they value schools. 
The magnitude of our estimates of the effect of school quality is in line with previous research for 
England and internationally (see Gibbons and Machin, 2008): prices increase from the mean by about 
3% for a one standard deviation improvement in school-mean age 7 to age 11 value-added, plus about 
3% for a one standard deviation increase in mean school achievements at age 7. It is useful to 
benchmark these effects against expected returns and alternative options for people considering buying 
a home in order to access a 'good' school. Firstly, it is clear that these price responses represent 
substantial amounts of money, given that the between-school variance in scores is low relative to the 
variance in achievements across pupils. The price response for a standard deviation in the pupil score 
distribution (2.7 value-added points) is around 11% or about £20,500 at the house prices prevalent at 
the time of our study (or approximately £1500 per year on a repayment mortgage over 25 years, at 5% 
interest rate). This cost is equivalent to just over 2.5 years of private schooling fees (about £2800 per 
term for private day-schooling in England in 2006-7).13  
Are these figures credible in terms of the value of investment in a child‟s education? To answer 
this question, consider first that Machin and McNally (2008) estimate a labour market return of about 
0.42% to a one percentile increase in age 10 test scores, for a cohort of children raised in the 1970s 
and 1980s. This implies that a one standard deviation improvement in achievement at this age raises 
future earnings by 12%. Next, following Machin et al. (2007), we calculate the present value of this 
12% increase on earnings between ages 16 and 65, discounted back to child's age 5 when parents are 
likely to buy their home for primary school admission.14 This calculation gives a discounted lifetime 
                                                 
13 These figures are derived from Independent Schools Information Service web site and available at: 
http://www.isc.co.uk/FactsFigures_SchoolFees.htm. 
14 Machin et al. (2007) estimate average yearly earnings for all individuals aged 16 to 64 in the Family Earnings Survey 
(2002/2003) to be at around £10,700. They then propose to use a discount rate of 3.5%, in line with the recommendations 
in the UK HM Treasury Green Book (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_greenbook_index.htm). Considering the 12% 
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benefit of approximately £20,600, which is amazingly close to the house price response to one 
standard deviation improvement in the pupil test score distribution (about £20,500). Of course, this 
comparison is based on the full capitalized value of the house, and the benefits of this investment 
could clearly outstrip the user costs taking into account potential house price appreciation. Similarly, 
the benefits could significantly outweigh the costs for families with more than one child. Nevertheless, 
these basic calculations still clearly illustrate that house price response to school quality is of a 
plausible magnitude given the expected return in terms of future earnings. 
                                                                                                                                                                
return to a one percentile increase in age 10 test scores discussed above, we estimate the benefits over ages 16 to 65, and 
discounted back to age 5, as follows: 
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6. Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Full data set Boundary sub-sample 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Price 182730 153372 195910 165360 
Log price 11.91 0.642 11.98 0.625 
Age 11-7 value-added 12.60 0.789 12.69 0.781 
Age 7 English and Maths points 14.90 1.093 14.62 1.087 
Age 11 English and Maths points 27.50 1.235 27.31 1.189 
Number of schools in catchment area 3.98 2.19 3.871 1.937 
Distance from home to school 2289.4 1376 1779.5 1083.8 
Distance to boundary - - 492.6 347.4 
Inverse distance weighted distance to boundary - - 133.2 202.9 
Distance between properties - - 723.1 402.2 
Inverse distance weighted property distance - - 205.5 133.2 
Observations 1656056 138132 
 
 
 
Table 2: Statistics for pupils crossing admission district boundaries 
 Full data set Boundary sub-sample 
Mean postcode proportion non-autonomous boundary crossers 0.033 0.062 
IDW mean postcode proportion non-autonomous  crossers - 0.250 
Median postcode proportion non-autonomous boundary crossers - 0 
Notes: Figures refer to proportions in the postcode. IDW means weighted by inverse distance between matched property 
transactions pairs (i.e. weighted toward observations that have zero-distance matches on opposite side to admission district 
boundary). 
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Table 3: OLS and cross-boundary difference models of the effect of school quality measures on house prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
Method: 
OLS all 
England 
OLS 
boundary 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M2 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M3 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M4 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M5 
Low cross. 
sample 
M6 
Eliminate 
geo-features  
M7 
Age 11-7 Value-added, (year 
t – t-4) 
**10.64 
(0.55) 
**14.23 
(1.03) 
**2.06 
(0.52) 
**3.82 
(0.90) 
**3.70 
(0.87) 
**3.69 
(0.87) 
**3.49 
(1.09) 
**3.62 
(0.95) 
Age7 English, maths (year t-
4) 
**3.66 
(0.45) 
0.53 
(1.05) 
**3.57 
(0.52) 
**2.86 
(0.85) 
**2.75 
(0.80) 
**2.75 
(0.80) 
**3.07 
(0.91) 
*2.27 
(0.91) 
Inverse property distance 
weights 
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Admissions authority 
boundary fixed effects 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary cubic No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1656001 138132 138132 138132 138132 138132 60394 118779 
Notes: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 to give the % effect of a one point change in explanatory variables. 
Dependent variable: log house sales price. School characteristics imputed from schools accessible from housing transaction site. Control variables are: 
average rooms per dwelling in transaction‟s census 2001 output area, census output area proportion of households social renting, census ward population 
density, ward proportion under continuous or semi-continuous urban landcover, number of schools accessible from transaction site, average distance to 
accessible schools, distance from transaction site to local authority boundary, year dummies. Sample based on transaction pairs for second-hand home sales 
in years 2003, 2004, 2005 and first quarter of 2006, from Land Registry “Pricepaid” postcode dataset. Columns (1) and (2) include additional controls for 
property type (detached, semi-detached, terraced, flat/maisonette) and ownership type (leasehold or freehold). All variables in Columns (3) to (7) are 
differences between neighbouring transaction pairs on opposite sides of school admissions authority boundary, where neighbouring pairs are matched by 
transaction year, property type and ownership type. Column (7) sample restricted to boundaries with below-median proportions (<5%) of pupils crossing. 
Column 8 eliminates cases where boundaries coincide with major roads, motorways and railways. Standard errors are clustered on matched nearest sites 
across boundaries (15489 clusters, Columns (3) to (7)), or clustered on Census ward (Columns (1) and (2)). Test for equality of coefficients on age 7 tests 
and value-added in weighted x-LA models Column (4) to (7) fails to reject null (e.g.: Column (6), p-value = 0.359). 
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Table 4: Falsification tests: Within-admissions zone and fake boundary difference models of the effect of 
school quality on house prices (Method M8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS 
within-LA    
sample 
Within-
LA 
Within-
LA 
OLS 
fake LA 
sample 
Cross 
fake LA 
Cross 
fake LA 
Cross 
fake LA 
Age 11-7 Value-added, (year t – 
t-4) 
**14.96 
(0.94) 
0.75 
(0.40) 
0.55 
(0.54) 
**16.85 
(1.50) 
1.08 
(0.76) 
0.68 
(1.16) 
0.57 
(1.56) 
Age7 English, maths (year t-4) **3.28 
(0.83) 
*0.74 
(0.35) 
0.79 
(0.48) 
-0.328 
(1.83) 
**2.74 
(0.67) 
0.24 
(1.23) 
0.15 
(1.23) 
Inverse distance weights No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Admissions boundary dummies - - - No No No Yes 
Distance to boundary cubic No No No No No No Yes 
Observations 130500 130500 130500 92054 92054 92054 92054 
Notes: as in Table 3. Column (1) includes additional controls for property type (detached, semi-detached, terraced, 
flat/maisonette) and ownership type (leasehold or freehold). All variables in Columns (2) and (3) are differences between 
neighbouring transaction pairs on same side of school admissions authority boundaries, where neighbouring pairs are 
matched by transaction year, property type and ownership type, and a minimum distance of 20m and maximum distance of 
1500m is imposed. Variables in Columns (5) to (7) are differences between neighbouring transaction pairs on opposite 
sides of „fake‟ school admissions authority boundaries, where neighbouring pairs are matched by transaction year, property 
type and ownership type. Fake boundaries are created by translation 10km North and East. Standard errors are clustered on 
matched nearest sites (Columns (2) and (3) and (5) to (7)), or clustered on Census ward (Columns (1) and (4)). 
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Table 5: Falsification checks with autonomous schools (Method M9) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS Cross- 
boundary 
M2/9 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M5/9 
Cross-LA 
boundary 
M5/9 
Age 11-7 Value-added, (year t – t-4), 
non-autonomous schools 
**9.40 
(0.51) 
**14.46 
(1.03) 
**2.02 
(0.52) 
**3.68 
(0.87) 
**3.70 
(0.87) 
Age7 English, maths (year t-4), non-
autonomous schools 
**2.30 
(0.43) 
-1.23 
(1.16) 
**3.49 
(0.52) 
**2.72 
(0.80) 
**2.72 
(0.80) 
Age 11-7 Value-added in autonomous 
schools 
**9.35 
(0.45) 
**9.89 
(1.05) 
1.07 
(0.61) 
0.72 
(0.80) 
0.74 
(0.89) 
Age7 English, maths (year t-4), 
autonomous schools 
**7.02 
(0.43) 
**5.76 
(0.97 
*1.60 
(0.62) 
0.70 
(0.80) 
0.66 
(0.80) 
Age 11-7 value-added autonomous x 
autonomous 
- - - - 1.93 
(1.15) 
Age 7 English maths, autonomous x 
autonomous 
- - - - -0.63 
(0.83) 
Inverse distance weights No No No Yes Yes 
Admissions boundary dummies No No No Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary cubic No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1656001 138132 138132 138132 138132 
Notes: as Table 3 and 4. Columns (1) and (2) include additional controls for property type (detached, semi-detached, 
terraced, flat/maisonette) and ownership type (leasehold or freehold). All variables in Columns (3) to (5) are differences 
between neighbouring transaction pairs on opposite sides of school admissions authority boundary, where neighbouring 
pairs are matched by transaction year, property type and ownership type. Standard errors are clustered on matched nearest 
sites across boundaries (15489 clusters, Columns (3) to (5)), or clustered on Census ward (Columns (1) and (2)). 
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Table 6: Some models with additional (potentially endogenous) controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Cross-
LA 
boundary 
Cross-
LA 
boundary 
Cross-
LA 
boundary 
Cross-
LA 
boundary 
Cross-
LA 
boundary 
Cross-
LA 
boundary 
Cross-
LA 
boundary 
Age 11-7 Value-added, (year t – 
t-4) 
**3.69 
(0.87) 
**3.42 
(0.89) 
**3.18 
(0.89) 
**3.91 
(1.03) 
*2.68 
(1.20) 
**3.18 
(0.85) 
**2.40 
(0.90) 
Age7 English, maths (year t-4) **2.75 
(0.80) 
**2.05 
(0.79) 
*1.89 
(0.79) 
**2.49 
(0.80) 
1.37 
(1.12) 
**2.38 
(0.76) 
0.36 
(0.85) 
Neighbourhood qualifications No p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 Matched 
quartile 
p=0.000 p=0.000 
Augmented neighbourhood 
controls 
No No p=0.000 p=0.000 No p=0.000 p=0.000 
House neighbourhood Age 7-11 
value-added and age 7 scores 
No No No p=0.006 No No No 
School expenditure  No No No No No p=0.296 No 
Local housing (council) tax rate No No No No No Yes No 
Pupil characteristics No No No No No No p=0.046 
Standard controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse property distance weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Admissions authority boundary 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Distance to boundary cubic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 138132 138132 138132 109941 74819 137827 137655 
Notes: as Table 3. All variables are differences between neighbouring transaction pairs on opposite sides of school 
admissions authority boundary, where neighbouring pairs are matched by transaction year, property type and ownership 
type. Standard errors are clustered on matched nearest sites across boundaries. Neighbourhood qualifications include 
proportion high qualified and proportion unqualified. Augmented neighbourhood control set includes proportion black, 
proportion inactive through illness, proportion unemployed, proportion with dependant children, proportion retired and the 
proportion of homes sold. School expenditure and local taxes control set includes expenditure per pupil, pupil-teacher ratio, 
number of full-time equivalent pupils and local housing taxes. Pupil characteristics include percentage pf pupil eligible for 
free school meals, percentage of pupils from ethnic minority and percentage of pupils with special educational needs. 
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Figure 1: Example extracts from the boundary sample (the data covers boundaries over all of England) 
Panel A: Map of the  Midlands, Manchester and Yorkshire 
 
Panel B: Map of the London and the South-East 
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Figure 2: Discontinuities and non-discontinuities in school quality and house prices 
Non-autonomous value-added, by non-autonomous value-
added, p=0.000 
Log house price, by non-autonomous value-added, 
p=0.007 
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Autonomous value-added, by autonomous value-added, 
p=0.000 
Log house price, by autonomous value-added,    
p=0.760 
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Notes: The scale on the x-axis is in metres from the boundary. The scale on the y-axis is in standard deviations. 
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Figure 3: Some example discontinuities and non-discontinuities in neighbourhood characteristics 
Households dwelling size. p=0.326 Population density: p=0.946 
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Households proportion black, p=0.914 Share of dwellings sold, p=0.076 
-.
8
-.
6
-.
4
-.
2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
-400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400
Boundary Distance
 
-.
8
-.
6
-.
4
-.
2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
-400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400
Boundary Distance
 
Households proportion social tenants, p=0.116 Households proportion unemployed, p=0.142 
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Figure 3 (Continued) 
Household proportion inactive through illness, p=0.105 Households proportion high qualified, p=0.007 
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Average distance to schools in catchment area, p=0.666 Number of schools in catchment area, p=0.651 
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Notes: The scale on the x-axis is in metres from the boundary. The scale on the y-axis is in standard deviations. 
 
